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Vidrala’s presence in a mature market with stable and predictable cash flows makes for a 
very attractive M&A target
Executive Summary
Company Overview Industry Overview
• Founded in 1965, Vidrala currently has 8 factories spread across 5 countries, 
being a dominant player in the Western European Market and serving 
approximately 1 600 customers
• The management team has created a strong player in the respective 
geographies through several successful M&A transactions
• Vidrala has been showing a stable and predictable cash flow generation and a 
leverageable balance sheet
• Being highly dependent on the respective end 
markets, this industry’s main drivers are population 
growth, urbanization, the sustainability trend and 
the premiumization of the end markets, with the 
latter increasing the penetration rate of glass over 
other packaging options
Investment Rationale
• Following the industry trend and company strengths, M&A 
consolidation creates value by increasing exposure in key 
geographies and diversifying product portfolio
• Using excess cash to develop factories 
in glass net importing countries adds 
more value than deleveraging further
• Leveraging the company’s focus on automation 
and increasing usage of cullet allows to increase 
EBITDA margins of the company
Entry Value Creation (in million €) Exit
• Entry will be priced at 7.5x EBITDA, 
according to the relative valuation. 
Overall, the acquisition of Vidrala and its 
target Zignago Vetro plus banking and 
due diligence fees results in a cost of        
€ 2.67Bn 
• The capital structure is composed by 66% 
of debt and 34% of equity, optimizing 
returns and respecting covenants 
• Management team will represent 10% of 
the institutional investment contributing 




Inst. Investors 2.8x 23.6%










• The exit strategies considered most 
suited for the deal are IPO due to deal-
size and Strategic Sale due to potential 










Main competitors in Western Europe
Fees
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• Vidrala is a leading producer of glass containers for the
food & beverage industries
• It also provides packaging services such as beverages
filling and logistic activities, which account for less than
10% of revenues
• Sales by product segment in 2019:
• Its strategy is to be the European low-cost producer,
always focused on customers and competitiveness,



















1965 – The company 
was installed in Llodio, 
(Alava – Spain) in 1965
1966 - Creation of 
Vidrierías de Álava S.A. 
Its manufacturing 
activity began in 1966 
with one furnace, two 
machines
1967 – Begins exporting
1977- Beginning of press & 
blow production of light 
bottles makes Vidrala the 
technological leader of 
the national market
1981- Transformation of 
furnaces, generating an 
energy saving of 50%,
maintaining productive 
capacity. Corporate name 
changed to Vidrala S.A.
1985 - Vidrala’s shares were 
launched on the stock 
market
1989 - Crisnova, a 100% 
subsidiary of Vidrala, started 
its activity in Caudete
1998 - Second Crisnova´s
furnace came into 
operation
1995 - Third Aiala’s furnace 
was built up
2001 - Approval of 
the Strategic Plan of 
corporate growth
2003 – Beginning of 
Internationalization 
process: Entry into 
Portuguese market 
with acquisition of 
Ricardo Gallo Vidro de 
Embalagem
2007 – Entry into Belgian 
market through acquisition 
of La Manufacture du Verre
2015 –Entry into UK and 
Ireland markets through 
the acquisition of Encirc 
Limited
2015 –Vidrala becomes 4th
largest European player, 
and offers a complete 
range of services
2017 - Acquisition of a 
new factory in Portugal 
(Santos Barosa)
2019 – Sale of La 
Manufacture du Verre, 
ending the presence in 
the Belgian Market
25,000 tons 130,000 tons 450,000 tons 805,000 tons 950,000 tons 1,600,000 tons 
2005 – Acquisition of a new 
plant in Spain and entry in 
Italian Market through 
acquisition of a factory
1965-1967 1967-1981 1981-1998 1998-2003 2003-2015 2015-2019








Company Overview | Company Profile & History
Sources: Company´s Published Reports
Outreach and sales by region
It currently operates through:
8 factories in 
5 countries, producing 
around 
8 billion containers per year 
Serving 1 600 customers 
and
Retaining 15% of the Western 
European market
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Considering market trends, glass will have an important role in the future of packaging
Glass bottles and containers Market
Global market size (in billion €)
• It is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4.1%
between 2020 and 2025
• Asia pacific is the biggest market , followed by 
Europe, where Germany, France and Russia 
account for a significant part of the revenues
• The market is competitive and increasingly 
concentrated
Main competitors in Western Europe
• The majority of glass packaging consumption is 
made by the alcoholic beverages industry,  with 



































looking for higher 
quality products, 
and do not mind 
paying a premium
Glass allows for 
attractive design 








• Increasing urban population and 
purchasing power
• Growing demand for alcoholic beverages, 
especially for beer
• Growing number of policies to reduce the 
use of plastics
• Increasing wine trade
















Market Overview | Global Glass Bottles and Containers Market
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Net importers of glass in Eastern Europe and North Africa represent the best opportunities 
for a greenfield expansion
Market Overview | Opportunities
Sources: Trade Map, Statista
Trade balance of the countries allow us to deepen our analysis 
regarding which markets to entry, since it shows us where 
demand is larger than what is being produced by the local 
producers
• In Eastern Europe: Romania and Latvia seem to be the 
regions where there is greater room for more producers 
• Regarding North African countries, there seems to be a lot 
of opportunities: Algeria, Morocco and Libya. However, in 
these countries a thorough analysis regarding political and 

















Europe   
Alcoholic drinks 208 530 3 221 57 215 32 728
CAGR  2019-2023 2.5% 6.5% 4.4% 2.3%
Non-Alcoholic drinks 137 137 18 501 19 400 10 440
CAGR 2019-2023 2.5% 11.5% 6.3% 3.3%
Food 639 913 131 212 323 516 81 077
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 8% 2.4% 1.7%
Beauty and personal care 58264 9 861 19 000 6 021
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 3.1% 2.7% 2%
OTC Pharmaceuticals 101 533 1 249 3 594 1 278
CAGR 2019-2023 3.7% 2% 3.1% 3.1%
End Markets size (in million €) and growth 
* Does not include Portugal, Spain nor Italy
Why Beauty and Personal care?
Mainly driven by consumer spending, the 
market is growing as beauty products 
increasingly make part of daily routines. High 
growth opportunities, especially for prestige 
and luxury products, account for 25% of 
revenues. In UK, Italy and Spain, where Vidrala
already operates, the share of people that buys 
these products is 28%, 22% and 21%, respectively
People are looking for visually appealing, 
sustainable and more natural products, with a 
packaging that allow them to see its quality
Why Pharmaceuticals?
Increasing consciousness about health and 
access to health care are driving the demand 
for pharmaceuticals up, particularly in middle 
income countries where it is growing at a 
faster pace 
Countries where Vidrala currently operates 
have high access to medicine. Glass is one of 
the main packaging solutions for medicine 
and drugs, allowing the products to keep 
their properties and contributing to 
sustainability
















Glass Trade balance in 2019 (USD thousand)
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Financial Analysis | Revenue Growth




Sources: Vidrala and Encirc’s website, Jornal de Negócios
• From 2012 to 2019 revenue more than doubled: CAGR 
12% 
• M&A activity accounted for more than 70% of the 
revenue increase in the period
• Encirc acquisition was the first expansion outside of 
continental Europe
• Vidrala is committed to invest in the companies 
purchased to guarantee improvement and 
sustainability
• Vidrala’s targets usually are recognized by investment 
in development and in strong customer relationships
1
• Encirc was acquired in 2015 with a valuation (EV) of    
€ 408.6M (6.8x EBITDA multiple)
• In 2017 Vidrala started investing £ 100M in new 
furnaces to “help fuel the sustainability strategy”. 
These furnaces with a minimum life span of 12 years 
were expected to secure £ 317M in value added each 
year. This action will continue until 2021
• The company kept its image, website and senior 
management. Vidrala therefore recognizes the value 
and brand power that this firm has in the UK & 
Ireland market
2
• Santos Barosa was acquired in 2018 with a valuation
(EV) of € 252.7M (7.7x EBITDA multiple)
• After the acquisition, according to BPI estimates,
Vidrala became the 2nd Largest glass packaging player
in Portugal (above BA glass and below Verallia).
• According to Vidrala, Santos Barosa had at the time





Santos Barosa Acquired 
Revenue
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Financial Analysis | Income Statement
M&A Activity is boosting growth and margins
in Million € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 458 474 469 803 774 823 955 1 011
Organic Growth Rate N/A 3.5% (1.0%) 2.3% (3.7%) (3.8%) 16.1% 5.8%
Inorganic Growth Rate N/A 0.0% 0.0% 69.1% 0.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0%
COGS (156) (157) (164) (304) (279) (277) (318) (320)
Gross Profit 301 317 304 499 495 546 637 691
Gross Margin (%) 65.8% 66.8% 64.9% 62.2% 64.0% 66.4% 66.7% 68.4%
Employee Expenses (100) (100) (96) (166) (166) (175) (190) (198)
Other Expenses (102) (106) (102) (178) (162) (181) (204) (207)
Other EBITDA 
Adjustments 2 3 1 (3) 5 (1) (2) (25)
Adjusted EBITDA 102 114 107 152 172 190 242 262
EBITDA Margin (%) 22.2% 24.1% 22.8% 18.9% 22.2% 23.1% 25.3% 25.9%
NOPAT 46 58 50 57 75 86 121 135
NOPAT Margin (%) 10.0% 12.2% 10.6% 7.1% 9.6% 10.4% 12.6% 13.4%
in Million € 2018 2019
Revenues 955 1 011
Iberian Peninsula 567 597
UK & Ireland 334 351
Italy 54 63
Rest of European Union – –
in Million € 2018 2019
Other expenses (204) (207)
External Services (46) (45)
Electricity (54) (51)







• Vidrala has been actively participating in M&A by 
acquiring manufacturing sites in strategical locations
• In 2015 Vidrala acquired its UK & Ireland divisions 
which added over € 300M in revenue. Organic growth 
rate was 2.3%
• In 2017 Vidrala completed another acquisition, Santos 
Barosa in Portugal, adding over € 140M in revenue
• In 2019 the Belgium site was sold to Carlyle Group 
Owned, Saverglass
• Vidrala’s strategy focuses on cost optimization and 
product mix diversification
1
• The acquisition of the UK & Ireland divisions hurt 
Vidrala’s margins as these divisions had significantly 
higher costs compared to others. In 2015, UK & 
Ireland had EBITDA margins close to 18% while other 
segments had close to 21%, with the Iberian Peninsula 
being the most profitable at circa 30%. Currently, UK 
has margins closer to 25%
2
• Energy consumption, specifically, electricity and 
natural gas represent one of the largest cost drivers 
as this industry is very energy intensive
• Sales expense refers to storage and transportation 
costs regarding its logistic services, another large 
standalone cost driver
3
• Employee Expenses and External Services (more 
specifically, maintenance and Insurance) are the two 
least variable captions when analysing a fixed vs 
variable cost basis





Sources: Vidrala’s annual reports
Vidrala’s Income statement key captions 2012-2019
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Financial Analysis | Balance Sheet
Vidrala’s has a strong balance sheet with room for more 
leverage
In Million € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Total Assets 695 700 669 1 200 1 096 1 405 1 407 1 458
Net PP&E 345 331 326 657 593 683 684 692
NWC excl. Cash 102 128 130 239 201 173 198 217
Inventories 113 126 124 201 181 190 185 195
Trade and other 
receivables 97 106 106 205 194 206 219 249
Trade and other payables 108 105 100 168 175 224 206 226
Cash 0,9 0,1 0,1 15,7 0,4 42,0 22,7 28,8
Total Liabilities 357 325 265 724 621 877 797 735
Total Financial Debt 160 118 68 420 323 529 434 364
Net Financial Debt/(Cash) 160 118 68 404 322 487 411 335
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.5x   1.0x   0.6x   2.5x   1.9x   2.5x   1.7x   1.2x   
• In this industry, Net Working Capital is on the high 
side as the companies need to invest significant 
portions in Inventories. As they are a B2B business, 
receivables and payables account for a significant 
portion in the Balance Sheet
• Although the NWC level has been increasing over 
time, Vidrala has improved its cash conversion cycle
2
2
• Vidrala’s business model requires it to have large 
PP&E investments, having the possibility to pose 
collateral for Financial Debt
• In 2015 the acquisition of Encirc increased the PP&E 
of Vidrala Group by adding 3 factories to its portfolio 
as well as in 2017 with the Santos Barosa acquisition
1
3
• Vidrala uses less leverage than its peers with Net 
Debt/EBITDA never surpassing 2.5x
• In the period under analysis, leverage is only 
increased during M&A activity
• As of 2020 H1 Net Debt/EBITDA is at 1.1x, showing 
that Vidrala is ready for a leveraging process for 
M&A activity in the future
• Under Spanish law, there is significantly more room 
for interest expenses, as it is still far from the 30% 
deductibility upper bound
3
Sources: Vidrala’s annual reports 
in Million € 2018 2019
Finance income 3 1
Finance costs (10) (7)
Interest on Loans (7) (5)
Hedging Derivatives (3) (2)
Other Financial Costs (1) (0)
in Million € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Total Assets 695 700 669 1 200 1 096 1 405 1 407 1 458
Total Current Assets 239 256 242 434 388 451 449 489
Total Liabilities 357 325 265 724 621 877 797 735
Total Current Liabilities 201 181 160 215 215 290 302 403
Assets/Liabilities 1.9x   2.1x   2.5x   1.7x   1.8x   1.6x   1.8x   2.0x   
Current Assets/ Current 
Liabilities 1.2x   1.4x   1.5x   2.0x   1.8x   1.6x   1.5x   1.2x   
• Here are represented 80% of the total assets and 
liabilities
• In 2019, PP&E accounts for almost a half of total 
assets (47%), while trade receivables, goodwill and 




Vidrala’s Balance Sheet key captions 2012-2019
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Financial Analysis | Free Cash Flow Map
Vidrala has stable and predictable Free Cash Flows
16.9% 13.4% 9.8%
Free Cash Flow Yield of 9.8% 1






2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
FCF Evolution 
(in million €)
Adjusted FCF Adjusted FCF, excluding M&A
2
• Vidrala’s FCF is stable and predictable, with only years 
of M&A activity having negative FCF
• If M&A transaction costs are excluded, FCF has a 
stable evolution at a 14.2% CAGR
• The decrease in the 2017 and 2018 Adjusted FCF, 
excluding M&A transaction costs can be explained by 
an increase in Maintenance Capex in 2017 and in 2018, 
an increase in both Maintenance Capex and 
investment in NWC
2
• 2019 adjusted Free Cash Flow was € 99M. This is a 
9.8% yield over the total revenue
• After the Income statement side, Capex is the largest 
cost driver. This is explained by Maintenance Capex 





Financial Analysis | Ratio Analysis
Vidrala has the highest ROA among its peers
• The period between 2014 and 2019 shows a declining 
trend in the cash conversion cycle of the firm. The 
component that has contributed more towards this 
trend is the decline in the holding period, meaning 
the firm took less time to sell its inventories. There 
was also an upward trend on the Payable period since 
as the company scales up, it has more bargaining 
power with its suppliers
• Regarding Vidrala´s position compared to its peers, it 
is observed that smaller players like Zignago Vetro and 
Vetropack have the worst cycles
1
• In the last 5 years there was an increase in the Return 
on Assets of the company. This happened due to 
improvements in the efficiency translated in the 
operational margins but also, because of a positive 
trend in the capacity of generating more sales with 
the assets of the company*
• The second graph shows that Vidrala presented in 
2019 the biggest ROA. When looking at the Asset 
turnover, it is seen that the best companies were 
Verallia and Vetropack. However, in the operational 
margin these 2 players are not as good
2
• The Return on Equity also shows an up-warding 
trend. This happened because although there has 
been a deleveraging of the company in the last 3-4 
years, the increases on Return on Assets more 
than compensated this negative trend in leverage
• Verallia is the player with the lowest return on 
assets and the highest ROE, which is driven by the 
highest level of leverage within its peers
3
*The decline in Asset turnover in 2017 happened due to the 
acquisition of Santos Barosa, since it increased significantly the 
























Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Cash Conversion 
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Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Return on Assets Leverage (Net debt/ EBITDA)ROE
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Financial Analysis | Ratio Analysis 
Vidrala shows good margins, despite the low leverage
EBITDA Margin 2019*












Zignago Verallia Vetropack BA Glass Vidrala








2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenue EBITDA EBITDA Margin
Vidrala’s EBITDA evolution*
(in million €)
Vidrala’s Net Debt / EBITDA evolution*
Net Debt/EBITDA 2019*









Zignago Verallia BA Glass Vidrala













• Vidrala has the lowest Net Debt/EBITDA ratio when 
compared with its peers. (Vetropack excluded from 
the analysis as it appears to have negative net debt)
• Net Debt has been decreasing in the past years 
except in 2017 – due to the acquisition of Santos 
Barosa
• Vidrala shows a great ability of generating stable 
cashflows, on the one hand due to the continuously 
improving EBITDA margin and, on the other hand the 
net debt evolution. Both these reasons indicate 
Vidrala as a possible LBO target
2
• Vidrala has good EBITDA margins, which have been 
improving consistently over the years
• EBITDA margin was 28.6% in the Iberian Peninsula, 
19.1% in Italy and 24.8% in UK & Ireland
• There can be room for operational improvement in 
the Italian segment. Notwithstanding that, BA Glass 
has only a warehouse in Italy and production in 
countries such as Greece, Bulgaria in Romania
1
Sources: *Companies’ annual reports
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- Vidrala has a leverageable Balance
Sheet with large assets to collateralize
- Vidrala’s strong and predictable cash 
flow generation allow M&A Activity




- Management team has high tenure in 
the company with deep industry 
knowledge
- Focus on operational improvements 
through M&A and it is observable in 
revenue per employee levels
- Two large acquisitions in the past 5 
years with successful integration 
and operational improvement
- Focus on product portfolio 
diversification and margins 
optimization
- General perception of Glass as a safe 
packaging material
- Premiumization of beverages 
increases demand for glass packaging
- Increasing consumer demand for 
environmentally sustainable products
















• Use Vidrala’s high & stable FCF generation and Management 
Team’s experience to acquire targets in strategical geographies 
and diversify product portfolio
• Continue to consolidate the western Europe market position
• Increase of Automation
• Decrease of Sales Expenses
• Increase in usage of recycled glass
• Increase presence and improvement of Vidrala’s division in Italy 
• Increase product portfolio and new end market
Buy-and-Build, Operational improvements and Greenfield development are the  most 
adequate strategies to create value for Vidrala
Greenfield Development
• Building a new plant can 
bring several opportunities 
to grow. Vidrala will be able 
to capture an important 
fraction of the market, 
taking advantage of its 
experience and efficiency to 
outperform current players
• Adrian Curry, Encirc’s
general manager, has 
experience in setting plants 
from scratch and can 
contribute with his expertise
• Savings in energy and COGS will be driven 
by: increase in usage of cullet, increased 
use of renewable sources and possible 
recovery of heat to be re-used in the 
production process (TASIO UE project)
• Continuation of the automation trend, in 
line with company´s investment in R&D, 
in areas such as robotics and big data, 
that until now have translated into the 
highest revenue per employee among 
competitors
Operational Improvements
Investment Thesis | Overview
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Investment Thesis | Buy-and-Build (I/III)
Market share gain, decreasing costs with synergies and a more diversified portfolio are the 
main reasons for a strategic acquisition
Horizontal Integration
Current Scenario
Vidrala already has an important position in 
the Western European market as a low-cost 
producer of containers for the food and 
beverage industries 
Vidrala’s core markets are Iberia, Italy and 
since the acquisition of Encirc also UK & 
Ireland
The group has been showing strong 
operational and financial results with a 
tendency to improve
However 
The production of glass containers is a very 
local business and Vidrala could benefit 
from being present in more European 
countries and enlarging its product 
portfolio
To
Unlock growth potential and reduce risks 
by diversifying its business
Opportunities
Increasing market share by 
exploiting room for 
consolidation
Creating synergies to keep 
improving operational 
efficiency
Taking advantage of a successful 
track record in M&A and 
management team expertise
• The glass containers market 
is increasingly concentrated 
and Vidrala has been 
consolidating its position
• Increasing the number of 
customers to keep 
diversifying the customer 








Revenue growth between 2012 and 
2019 in million euros
• Vidrala’s COGS expenses 
account for a greater 
percentage of sales when 
compared to some of its peers
• On the other hand, Vidrala is 
better in terms of automation. 
Showing a much greater 
revenue per employee, its 
processes can be implemented 
in the acquired company
• Increase the amount of 
recycled glassed used in the 
production of glass to reduce 
costs and energy consumption
• Reduction in sales expenses, in 
costs associated with storage 
and transportation in 
overlapping geographies













• Vidrala’s acquisitions have 
cause the most significant 
growth in the company’s 
revenues, a trend that should 
be exploit 
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Investment Thesis | Buy-and-Build (II/III)
Plan A consists of acquiring Zignago Vetro, due its product portfolio and strong positioning   
in Western Europe
Acquisition plans
Sources: Vidrala, Zignago Vetro, Vetropack, Eurovetro, Google Maps Notes: *Company profile in the appendix
Plan A – Zignago Vetro Plan B – Vetropack Why Zignago over Vetropack? Criteria for Other Targets 
Zignago Vetro is the best acquisition target for 
Vidrala since it checks most criteria the company 
defined in 2015 when acquiring Encirc:
• Customer diversification
• Different Product-Mix weights
• Consolidation of the Western Europe market
• Usage of higher cullet rates due to already 
existent vertical integration
In addition, Zignago Vetro has a more complete 
product portfolio than Vidrala, adding:
• Cosmetics and Perfumery
• Specialty Glass Containers
Zigango’s presence in Italy can also be leveraged 
to improve the overall performance of the 
group’s operations in that country
Zignago’s ownership of joint ventures Vetri
Speciali and Vetreco, 50 and 30% respectively, are 
not considered since these targets are not 
strategically fit
If for any reason the acquisition of 
Zignago Vetro fails a Plan B is 
considered 
Most criteria also check for 
Vetropack however, with less 
influence in the Western Europe 
Market
Vetropack also has a larger 
product portfolio than Vidrala:
• Pharmaceutical Packaging
There are three main reasons 
to choose Zignago over 
Vetropack:
• Core Markets
Zignago Vetro has presence in a 
Western European Market 
where Vidrala is not (France)
• Potential Deal Size
Vetropack has a much larger 
EBITDA than Zignago (€ 170M 
vs € 79M) which would bring 
higher risk to the deal, albeit 
Zignago’s EBITDA is still 
relevant
• Better EBITDA margins
Zignago Vetro has already 
better margins than Vetropack
In case both deals fail it is 
important to define some 
criteria so that the deal 
succeeds:
Tier 1:





• Deal size or combined size 
of the companies acquired 
• Cullet utilization rate
• Speed of the Due 
Diligence Process
Moreover, vertical 
integration can also be 
considered in order to 
increase the cullet utilization 
rates. One example could be 
Eurovetro*, which is only, 20 
minutes away from Vidrala’s 
facilities in Italy
If the acquisition of Vetropack is 
not possible smaller acquisitions 
should be considered according to 
the established criteria
Note that probably these 
companies will not have recycled 
glass providers, and so, in this 
case vertical integration should 
also be considered




Investment Thesis | Buy-and-Build (III/III)
The targets considered will help Vidrala to consolidate its position in Europe
Targets
Sources: Zignago Vetro 2019 annual report, Vetropack 2019 annual report



































Also sells to other 
European countries and 
USA
+   Reducing overhead costs 
+   Improving margins, especially in Italy, where
both firms operate
+   Decrease risk through product diversification
+   Less capital required for the acquisition
- EBITDA growth is not as high as Vetropack’s
- Feasibility of dropping existing Joint Ventures
- Growth of Geographical market below the one 
presented by Vetropack
+   Rapid market share gain and expansion to 
Eastern Europe
+   Improving margins, especially in Italy, where 
both firms operate
+   Decrease risk through product diversification 
- Significant amount of capital required to 
acquire the firm
- Possible problems with EU competition 
regulatory authority 
- Does not follow as well as Zignago Vetro the 
criteria of Western Europe market 
consolidation





























Notes:*excluding Joint-Ventures. **Margin uplift is defined as the increase in EBITDA 





Investment Thesis | Operational Improvements
Automation and integration of big data will be the main operational improvements behind
the increase in EBITDA margin
Revenue per employee 
(in €)
• Maintain the path of automation and digitalization of the production 
process with inclusion of robotics and bid data into making the 
production process as efficient as possible
• From 2014 to 2019, the company increased the ratio of revenue per 
employee from € 251.7 to € 268.4. In the upcoming years, the companies' 
investment in R&D will be maintained and push the Vidrala Academy 
towards the goal of achieving a revenue per employee of € 295.7
• This obviously directly impacts the personnel expenses and 
consequently key performance ratios such as the EBITDA margin
• As a member of the FEVE association, Vidrala has committed to increase 
the % of cullet in its production process. This will allow the company to 
decrease the costs associated with electricity and raw materials and to 
increase the capacity of each furnace, since the duration of the melting 
process also decreases with the usage of cullet*
Sources: *Research Gate, Impact of Glass Cullet on the Consumption of Energy and Environment in the Production of Glass Packaging Material
Rate of Cullet Inclusion
• Investments are planned with the goal of increasing efficiency and 
consequently reduce the weight of the raw materials in the cost 
structure of the company. The investments in furnace upgrades promise 
to bring marginal decreases in the % of COGS relative to sales along the 
next years. At the same time, Investments in the UK & Ireland region are 
expected to push this segment of the company closer to the margins of 
the rest of the group and decrease the weight of the COGS to around 
30% of revenues
COGS as % of Revenue
Vidrala Gross Margin Vetropack Gross Margin 
2019
Zignago Vetro Gross 
Margin 2019
The efforts to include of Cullet and furnace upgrades will 
cause an increase on the gross margin of Vidrala, moving 
progressively closer to the gross margins of certain 
competitors/ targets of similar size to Vidrala
Vidrala EBITDA Margin
The continuous investment regarding the integration of 
robotics and big data in the production process will 
continue to increase the revenue per employee and will 







(excluding joint ventures) 
In order to be able to achieve these improvements, Vidrala will have to keep investing in technology. 
This way, beyond the expansion capex, the levels of capex will be 16% higher (the average for the last 
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Investment Thesis | Greenfield Development
Although the industry is going through a consolidation proccess, Romania is suited for a 
greenfield development due to its glass trade balance, market size and growth
Sources: Vidrala Annual Report, Glass International, Eurostat, IMF
The location chosen to build the new plant was
• Romania is a net importer of glass containers
• It is an Eastern European country, giving Vidrala the 
oportunity to benefit from big markets with higher 
growth rates
• Its proximity to several other countries in this region 
that Vidrala may serve as well: Moldavia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary
• Lower labor, land and production costs








Gross PP&E per plant- Average of the current GPP&E per furnace was used. 
Although land might be cheaper in Romania, there is great uncertainty about 
other possible investments
Revenue- average revenue per furnace was used and an assumption regarding 
the number of furnaces to build was made according to the demand identified 
by the group according to the size of the market, growth rates and trade balance
Net Working Capital- Worst captions of last 4y of Vidrala were assumed as a 
starting point, with improvements taking place over the years
Employee Expenses- Calculated according to Average Hourly manufacturing 
costs in Romania (Eurostat), evolving according to inflation throughout the 





Construction of the plant will start in 
the beginning of 2021
Years until plant starts producing 
1 year
Production capacity in
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
50% 70% 100%
Millions of € 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenues - 53.2 85.1 109.6 113.0 117.4
Gross Profit - 27.9 50.7 76.1 79.1 82.5
Gross margin - 52.4% 59.5% 69.4% 70.0% 70.3%
EBITDA - 9.2 27.1 48.7 51.0 53.5
EBITDA Margin (%) - 17.3% 31.8% 44.4% 45.1% 45.6%
EBIT - (0,2) 17,6 39,2 41,6 44,1
EBIT Margin (%) - (0.4%) 20.7% 35.8% 38.3% 39.1%
NOPAT - (0.2) 14.8 33.0 34.9 37.0
Δ in Net Working Capital - (13.2) (7.5) (5.7) (0.2) (0.4)
CAPEX (134.6) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
FCF (134.6) (13.4) 7.3 27.2 34.7 36.6
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By acquiring Zignago Vetro, Vidrala can improve financial performance of its Italian division
Overview
• Target with overlap on end markets where Italian division of Vidrala has 
weak presence
• Western Europe presence






Historical Financials, in Million € – excluding joint ventures
Geographical Presence Product Portfolio




Roberto Cardini CEO 10 years
Roberto Celot CFO 13 years
Paolo Giacobbo BOD Chairman 10 years
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Investment Thesis | Targets Overview
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Vetropack is the largest feasible target within addressable market criteria, creating   
synergies in geographical exposure and usage of cullet
Investment Thesis | Targets Overview
Overview
• Target with overlap on end markets where Italian division of Vidrala has 
weak presence
• New end market exposure






Historical Financials, in Million €
Geographical Presence Product Portfolio




Johann Reiter CEO 10 years
David Zak CFO 18 years
Claude Cornaz BOD Chairman 27 years
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Eurovetro could be a solution to complement the acquisition of other non-considered 
horizontal expansion targets
Investment Thesis | Targets Overview
Overview
• Glass waste management company with upscale potential, saving costs 
in the sourcing of cullet for Vidrala






Historical Financials, in Million €
Geographical Presence Product Portfolio




Pierluigi Galli Everything Founder
Patrizia Quadrelli Board Member Founder
Gabriele Zerbi Board Member Founder
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• Main source of EBITDA Margin expansion 
comes from COGS as acquiring companies 
who use more recycled glass allow for lower 
COGS and accelerate the glass production 
process
• By using a higher share of recycled glass in 
the manufacturing process, Vidrala reduces 
Electricity costs as glass takes less time in 
the furnaces to be complete
• Finally, by introducing Vidrala’s significantly 
more automated process to its target, it 
allows to reduce Employee Expenses in the 
acquired targets
Margin Uplift
• Maintenance CAPEX is expected to remain 
at historical levels, with a slight increase for 
Vidrala’s current schedule
Capex
Business Plan | Growth Forecasts Overview
The Business Plan forecasts an additional € 621M in Revenue and € 247M in EBITDA 
Values in M EUR
Top Line Bottom Line Expansion
• GDP Growth and share of Urban population 
are the main growth drivers
• Premiumization of alcoholic beverages 
increase demand for glass
Organic Growth
• Acquire an additional € 332M in 2022 in 
Europe to expand presence in Italian market 
and add exposure to the Pharmaceutical & 
Cosmetics end markets as well as other 
European Countries
• Leverage targets’ connections with cullet 
providers to increase share of recycled glass
Inorganic Growth • Investment in Net Working Capital is 
expected to follow the historical correlation 
with company growth
• Furthermore, inventory synergies are 
expected to be introduced by increasing the 
business scale. Using a conservative 
forecast of a 2.5% yoy improvement, CCC is 
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Capex (excl. M&A)





















4,5x 5,5x 6,5x 7,5x 8,5x 9,5x 10,5x
Combining several valuation methodologies resulted in a multiple of 7.5x, which correspond 
to an enterprise value of € 2Bn for Vidrala
Valuation | Entry Valuation





















This method includes 
information from 8 
past transactions from 
the last 6 years, which 
were considered 
relevant for our 
valuation. However, it 
is important to stress 
that some deals’ sizes 
were smaller than the 
current one
EV/EBITDA Cycle 
This method was 
used in order to 
understand how 
the multiple has 
been evolving over 
time. For this 
purpose, the next 
twelve months 
EV/EBITDA 
multiples from the 
last 10 years were 
retrieved
LBO Valuation
The LBO method reflects 
the entry multiple that 
by considering the exit 
proceeds allows the 
fund to obtain the 
target return (20%-30%)
EV/EBITDA
Current next twelve months EV/EBITDA helps 
measuring the enterprise value of peers in 
relative terms. It does not take into 
consideration the capital structure, reflecting 
mainly the operational performance. Vidrala 
and Zignago Vetro’s multiples are way above 
the average of 7.9x (10.2x and 11.2x 
respectively). While these companies may be 
more competitive and should have an above 
the average entry multiple, it does not seem 
reasonable to assume their current trading 
multiples to enter in the project 
2nd Quartile to 
Median
Median to 3rd 
Quartile
DCF Model
For the DCF model valuation, it is 
considered Vidrala’s predicted 
free cash flows without 
synergies, a WACC of 6.5%
(Bloomberg Estimate) and a 
perpetual growth rate of 0.5%, 
which are then used for sensitivity
Share Price
The share price analysis is a 
reality check for the entry 
multiple as it reflects the 
company’s market value. To 
perform this valuation, data 











Capital Structure | Sources and Uses (I/II)
Entry debt is assumed to account for 66% of the capital 
structure, representing 5.12x the EBITDA for the both firms
1
3
Uses of FundsSources of Funds








Total EV 2 585.6 96.64%






FRI 692.7 2.63x 25.9%
Ordinary Equity 63.2 0.2x 2.4%





FRI 161.9 2.04x 6.1%
Total Equity 917.8 34.3%
TOTAL SOURCES 2 672.4 7.79x 100%






Senior debt 1 054.3 5x 39.5%




Senior debt 436.7 5.5x 16.3%
Total debt 1 754.6 65.7%
Fees In million € % of Total Uses
DD Fees 25.9 1.0%
Advisory Fees 25.9 1.0%
Banking Fees 35.0 1.36%
Total Fees 86.8 3.36%
TOTAL USES 2 672.4 100%
2
4
Notes: A more detailed version of Sources in Uses is available in Slide 69 of Additional Considerations
Taking into consideration the capex requirements for 
the project and the future cash flow generation, the 
capital structure is expected to be composed by 65.7% 
of debt and 34.3% of equity (5.12x the Sum of EBITDA 
of Vidrala and Zignago). These figures show lower 
leverage when compared with deal of Apollo which 
took place in 2015
2
Vidrala is assumed to be acquired for € 1.99Bn at the 
end of 2020 and Zignago Vetro one year later for                
€ 598.6M, with the same entry multiple of 7.5x. Adding 
3.36% in fees, it results in a total investment of 
€ 2.67Bn
1
The Management Team receives ownership of 10% of 
the Ordinary Shares. For that, they pay 2x their fixed 
component of the annual salary at entry (to 
guarantee they have “skin in the game”). The 
Institutional Investors figure is computed maintaining 
the price paid per % of ownership equal to the 
management team. The Fixed Return Instrument 
accounts for the rest of the equity and has a hurdle 
rate of 10%. The second capital call is done through an 
FRI in order not to dilute the Management Team
4
Considering the entry levels of each company 
separately: Vidrala is acquired with 63.6% of Debt and 
36.4% of Equity, while Zignago Vetro is acquired with 
72% of Debt and 27% of Equity
3
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Assuming an Exit in 2025, the Institutional Investors are expected to obtain a money   
multiple of 2.8x and an IRR of 23.6%
Returns | Exit Waterfall
Entry Proceeds Recap. Exit Proceeds
Inst. Investors
Fixed Return Instrument € 693M € 162M € 1 353M
Inst. Investor Shares € 57M € 1 189M
Returns Management
Sweet Equity € 6M € 132M
• After an Investment period of 5 years, the Exit is planned for 2025. At this point the sum of the EV and Cash adds up to € 3.9Bn
• At Exit, fees were considered lower in percentage of the Total deal since there are lower due diligence requirements, banking and advisory fees. The total amount of 
Debt which is still left to amortize from both Debt calls is close to € 1.1Bn, and there is still a total of approximately € 2.7Bn left to be distributed to the Fund and the 











7.0x   
2.19x   2.54x   2.88x   
7.5x   
2.43x   2.79x   3.14x   
8.0x











7.0x    22.7% 21.3% 19.9%
7.5x   26.0% 23.6% 21.7%
8.0x 29.1% 25.8% 23.3%
Institutional and Management Returns
Exit Waterfall (in million €)
• Management Team: The management team pays a total of € 6.3M for 10% of 
the Ordinary shares. After 5 years they are expected to receive € 132M. The 
payoff to the management team is expected to yield an IRR of 83.27% and a 
money multiple of 20.9x. The 2nd capital call to acquire Zignago (€ 162M) is 
done with a Fixed Return Instrument to avoid dilution Management team
• Institutional Investors: The institutional investors enter the deal with a total of     
€ 911M, divided into FRI ( € 855M ) and Ordinary Shares ( € 57M). At exit, the 
institutional investors are expected to get a total of € 2.5Bn, yielding a MM of 2.8x 
and an IRR of 23.6%
132
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• Both Vidrala and the main 
acquisition targets are already 
Publicly traded
• Deal size won’t cause any strain in 
taking company public
• Higher degree of uncertainty of 
returns due to being dependent on 
market conditions
• Follows trend of industry 
consolidation
• Interesting target due to high 
degree of automation from Vidrala
• Evidence of cross-continent M&A 
activity in this sector (CVC with BA 
Glass)
• Private Equity activity with highest 
dry-powder level in history ($2.5Tn)
• Attractive target with stable cash 
flows and recent greenfield 
development at exit
• Ability to partner with strategic 
buyer
• Potential due to competitive 
concentration in western Europe
• Clients may wish to vertically 
integrate some factories
• Possible red flag from competition 
authorities due to excessive 
industry concentration
• Higher difficulty to find buyers 
when compared with IPO 
• Deal size excludes many buyers, 
creating a large necessity for a club 
deal
• Negotiations can lower the 
possibility of returns derived from 
multiple arbitrage
• Loss of Synergies already present 
and obtained from acquisitions 
• Difficulty/work needed to find a 
buyer for each part 
Note: Heineken included since in a company report is mentioned to be a client both in Great Britain and in Continental Europe
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Individual Reflection
Private Equity Role in Consolidation M&A Bridge between ESG and Returns
• With markets becoming more and more efficient, target returns for typical Private Equity funds 
of 20% to 25% IRR are becoming ever more difficult. Furthermore the current levels of dry powder 
in the market, are driving entry multiples up, making deals less attractive as the funds have an 
increased risk of exiting at a lower multiple than they started. 
• On the other hand, with targets such as Vidrala that are industry leaders in efficiency and 
profitability, it becomes even harder to find any potential EBITDA uplift and thus making a deal 
more attractive. One way private equity funds have tackled the lack of additional operational 
improvements to be done is to participate in M&A deals and benefit themselves from the 
synergies the deals create. This was the group’s idea and the core value creation strategy around 
Vidrala. It is not as simple as buying many parts and creating a larger company, one must be able 
to clearly identify and execute deal synergies, be it from cost reduction measures to increasing 
revenues. For this to happen, the fund must also be backed by a management team like Vidrala’s, 
who have deep industry knowledge, but also a track record in M&A where synergies are clearly 
executed and value is created. Having done 3 very successful deals in the past 8 years and having 
such long tenures, Vidrala’s management team is the one to source deals, identify and execute 
on synergies, creating value for both companies and also the investors.
• The Private Equity fund however also plays a key role in this game, which is deal financing. 
General Partners serve as a bridge between investors and targets who seek an injection of 
equity, acting as a sort of bank, but also bringing more value to the table, being able to finance 
succeeding M&A deals with the fund’s equity, and also with by being able to bring levels of Debt 
the company hasn’t used, at interest rates that are lower than the target has in practice. This is a 
key component of deals focused on industry consolidation as the target doesn’t need to wait for 
debt levels to stabilize before going through a repeated leveraging process.
• Both combined allows for the target companies to go through the consolidation trend faster 
than competitors, as well as Private Equity funds achieving its targeted returns of above 20% IRR.
By participating in Corporate M&A, Private Equity funds unlock growth potential faster    
than market trends, and can act as a bridge between ESG criteria and financial interests
• The glass packaging industry is a perfect example of how 
to align financial interests with ESG trends. Glass itself is 
more environmentally friendly than the selected 
competitor packaging solutions (e.g. plastic) because of 
not only its ability to keep the contents’ chemical 
composition and being infinitely recyclable. However when 
looking more deeply into the production process of glass 
packaging, the group identified that it was very energy 
intensive  (e.g. Vidrala spends 5% of revenues on energy), to 
levels that the amount of solar panels to make the whole 
process green would make the whole intention pointless.
• One big trend in the industry is the usage of more cullet In 
the production process, in other words, more recycled 
glass. This allows the company to use less energy in the 
production process as cullet takes less time to turn into 
molten glass, and achieving the same valuable product in 
the end. This is one example in the glass packaging industry 
of how to align financial incentives with more qualitative 
incentives to be green.
• Some Private Equity funds are nowadays trying to build this 
bridge even further by creating management team 
packages that are not only tied financial metrics like 
EBITDA but also with non-financial metrics like customer 
satisfaction, recycling rates, employee satisfaction, factors 
which will act both as a boost towards financial 
performance and allow the fund to exit at a premium by 
delivering a higher value proposition to the next buyer.
